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BOOK REVIEW
BODY BANKING FROM THE BENCH TO THE BEDSIDE
BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK, AND
SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA. By Kara W. Swanson. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 20 1 4. Pp.333. $35.00.

Reviewed by Natalie Ram*
How much is a kidney worth? An ounce of breast milk? Genetic
material from an individual facing a Parkinson's diagnosis? In today's
America, it depends on who is selling. One might think that such
body products are beyond value or that their value depends on the individual characteristics of the supplier. But under existing American
law and practices, what matters more is whether the seller is also the
supplier of that body product, or whether the seller is another entity,
such as a pharmaceutical company, hospital, or biobanker.l
Under existing American law, for instance, an individual may not
sell her kidney for "valuable consideration."z Nor mayan individual
direct that her body be sold for profit to a medical school after her
death. 3 Yet a medical school receiving such a donation is free subsequently to sell that body to a peer institution, in whole or in part
(p. 245).4
* Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B.,
Princeton University. Many thanks to Gregory Dolin, David Jaros, members of the UB/UM junior faculty workshop, and the participants of the Biobanking Eggs and Embryos for Research
workshop for their helpful comments on this project. Thanks also to the editors of the Harvard
Law Review for their insightful suggestions and corrections throughout the editing process. All
errors are my own.
1 The bioethics literature typically describes a research body bank as a "biobank," as it is a
bank of biological specimens. Beyond this general definition, however, "[s]ignificant variation in
biobank types [has left] scholars unable to agree upon a definition" of what exactly counts as a
biobank. Gail E. Henderson et aI., Characterizing Biobank Organizations in the U.S.: Results
from a National Survey, GENOME MED., Jan. 20l3, art. 3, 2. In keeping with Swanson's language describing the medical "body bank," this Review refers to body banks for research purposes
as "body banks" and "biobanks" interchangeably.
2 National Organ Transplant Act § 30l(a), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (20l2).
3 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (providing instead that "an anatomical gift of a donor's
body or part may be made during the life of the donor for the purpose of transplantation, therapy,
research, or education").
4 See also Bridget J. Crawford, Our Bodies, Our (Tax) Selves, 3l VA. TAX REV. 695, 709-IO
(20l2); David E. Harrington & Edward A. Sayre, Paying for Bodies, but Not for Organs, REGULATION, Winter 2006-2007, at l4, l4 ("[M]edical schools often have a surplus of cadavers while
other institutions cannot find the tissues and body parts they need via markets .... One of the
reasons for the glut of cadavers at medical schools is that most states allow government officials
to donate unclaimed bodies to medical schools, often specifying which schools are eligible for the
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A similar disparity in payment arises when human breast milk is at
issue. Payments for breast milk are not illegal, but they are often
frowned upon 5 - and where such payments do occur, they may stand
in stark disparity to the payments received by others in the bodyproduct supply chain. Consider, for instance, the business model of
Prolacta Bioscience. Through a network of twelve national, regional,
and local milk banks, Prolacta Bioscience encourages breastfeeding
mothers to donate milk their own infants do not need. 6 Up until last
year, Prolacta did not pay these women for their milk, assuring them
that "[b]reast milk donors report a sense of satisfaction knowing they
are providing their milk to help premature or sick infants."7 Indeed, a
Prolacta-sponsored website continues to explain that "[t]he current
practice in North America is to accept breast milk donations without
compensating the mother."8 Even now, Prolacta and its affiliated milk
banks offer payment of only up to one dollar per ounce of shipped
breast milk - and they insist that this payment is merely an "expense
reimbursement. "9 Meanwhile, the milk banks "receive payment from

bodies."); Stephanie Armour, Donated Bodies Sometimes Are Sold for Personal Profit, USA ToDAY (Apr. 28, 2006, I2:S6 AM), http://usatodaY30.usatoday.comltech/science/2006-04-27-body
-parts-sold_x.htm [http://perma.cc/sDGC-AEYY] (noting that "Tulane University's medical
school received more cadaver donations than it could use," and that it and other universities "typically share any surplus cadavers with other medical schools," as well as with private research
firms for a "processing fee").
5 See Robin Erb, Detroit Moms Protest Breast Milk Banking Effort, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Jan. I4, 20IS, IO:34 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/health/20IS/OI/I3/breast-milk-bank
-protest-detroitl2 I 7020 I 9 [http://perma.cc/ 4GP6-GDJW].
6 See PROLACTA BIOSCIENCE, http://www.prolacta.com [http://perma.cc/UEgQ-JK2B].
7 Knowledge Center, PROLACTA BIOSCIENCE, http://www.prolacta.com/knowledge-center
[http://perma.cc/8N3G-TP8L] (responding to the question: "Why should I donate?"); see also Andrew
Pollack, Breast Milk Becomes a Commodity, with Mothers Caught Up in Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
20, 20IS), http://www.nytimes.com/20IS/03/2 I/business/breast-milk-products-commercialization
.html.
8 Milk Banking Frequently Asked Questions, MILKBANKING.NET, http://www.milkbanking
.netlfaqs [http://perma.ccJ7FJT-FRZ6] (responding to the question: "Will I be paid for my donations?"). As recently as October 20I4, Prolacta's main website provided the same response. See
Knowledge Center, PROLACTA BIOSCIENCE, https://web.archive.org/web/20I4I027202I42/http://
www.prolacta.com/knowledge-center (archived Oct. 27, 20I4) (responding to the question: "Why
doesn't Prolacta pay mothers for their milk donations, but sells the end product?").
9 See, e.g., Expense Reimbursement Terms and Conditions, WESLEY MED. CTR., http://www
.wesley. prolacta.com/donate-breast-milk#reimbursement [http://perma.cc/F 5 6H -RY 2S] (explaining that supplying mothers who register by a certain date and ship 300 ounces of human breast
milk within an "initial qualification period (I23 days from date of blood sample collection)" are
eligible to receive $300, but explaining further that "[e]ach donor can be eligible for only one reimbursement check for donations made through any Prolacta-affiliated donor milk program"); see
also Carolina Buia, The Booming Market for Breast Milk, NEWSWEEK (May 23, 20IS, 4:II PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/booming-market-breast-milk-33S IS I [http://perma.cc/7 D EZ-D4LR]
(reporting that Prolacta and Medolac (another bioscience company) "pay their screened donors $I
an ounce").
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Prolacta Bioscience for the milk they collect."l0 And having acquired
human breast milk with little or no compensation to its supplying
mothers, Prolacta processes, fortifies, and sells that milk to hospital
nurseries for as high as $r80 or more per ounceY
This virtual exclusion of supplying bodies from the chain of compensation extends beyond medical treatment into the realm of medical
research. In January 20r5, 23andMe, a provider of direct-to-consumer
genetic analysis, announced high-profile data-sharing arrangements
through which multiple pharmaceutical companies will gain access to
the full genetic profiles of thousands - and in some instances, hundreds of thousands - of 23andMe's customersY While the financial
details of a deal 23andMe struck with Pfizer are unknown, another
pharmaceutical company, Genentech, agreed to pay 23andMe ten million dollars upfront, with additional payments of up to fifty million
dollars should the research prove good for business. 13 The ultimate
providers of all that genetic information, however, will not be paid for
the use of their genetic information. 14

10 Milk Banking Frequently Asked Questions, supra note S (responding to the question: "Will I
be paid for my donations?").
11 See Pollack, supra note 7; see also Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers' Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, IO NEV.
L.J. 29, 33 (2009); Ricardo Lopez, Prolacta Develops Niche Delivering Breast Milk to
Hospitals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 25, 20I3, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/businesslla-fi-breast
-milk-processing-20I3I025-story.html [http://perma.cc/9KN4-BCTP] (observing that a bottle of
Prolacta fortified milk "can cost $I25 to $3I2, depending on the caloric formulation"). The price
Prolacta can charge for its fortified breast milk product reflects more than merely the price of the
human breast milk alone. Prolacta holds several patents "for standardized human milk products
as well as for the production and use of these products," and so can charge premium prices.
Our Intellectual Property, PROLACTA BIOSCIENCE, http://www.prolacta.com/our-intellectual
-property [http://perma.cc/XJL3-74HR]; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patents, Antitrust, and the
High Cost of Health Care, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 20I4, art. 2, at 2, http://www.americanbar
.orglcon ten tldam/aba/pu blishing/an ti trusLsource/apr I 4_cotter_4 -Sf.au thcheckdam. pdf [http:1 I
perma.cc!7Z4L-MLNP] (noting that because patents confer monopoly rights and therefore market
power, "it should not come as a big surprise when [the health care companies that own patents]
charge prices that exceed marginal cost").
12 See Press Release, 23andMe, 23andMe Announces Collaboration with Pfizer Inc. to Conduct Genetic Research Through 23andMe's Research Platform (Jan. I2, 20I5), http://
mediacen ter. 23andme .com/blo gl 20 I 510 II I 212 3andme-pfizer-research -pia tform [http://perma.cc
IQ2KL-5MXH]; Press Release, 23andMe, 23andMe and Genentech to Analyze Genomic Data for
Parkinson's Disease (Jan. 6, 20I5), http://mediacenter.23andme.comlblog/20I5/0I/06/23andme
-genentech-pd [http://perma.cc/4SGN-ACHM]; see also Davey Alba, 23andMe Teams with Big
Pharma to Find Treatments Hidden in Our DNA, WIRED (Jan. I2, 20I5, 4:3I PM), http://www
.wired.coml 20 I 5/0 II 23andme-partners-big -pharma-find- treatmen ts-hidden-genes [http://perma.cc
1659Z-VMCH] (reporting that the agreement between 23andMe and Pfizer will grant Pfizer access
to the genetic information of 650,000 of 23andMe's customers).
13 See Alba, supra note I2.
14 Customers may, however, be paid "up to a value of $30 per half hour of expected time" for
answering surveyor other questions about themselves. Research Consent Document, 23ANDME,
h ttps:1Iwww.23andme.com/aboutlconsent[https:llperma.cc/D B 3 G-R6R 7].
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Moreover, while 23andMe customers are permitted to broadly consent to or refuse participation in all "23andMe Research," they have no
ability to consent to some, but not all, research studies that might use
their genetic information. 15 Indeed, as 23andMe enthusiastically notes,
"[o]n average, a customer who consents to research contributes to over
230 studies."16 Still, these body-bank suppliers exercise more control
over their genetic information than many. Often, in research settings,
the sources of body products may not even have the opportunity to refuse participation, as their consent will never be sought.17

15 See Research, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/research [http://perma.cc/SNBV
-7W5 B].
16 Id.
17 Under existing federal human subjects research protections, so long as privacy is assured by
de-identifying data or human biological specimens, researchers need not obtain consent to use
such data or specimens. See How Can Covered Entities Use and Disclose Protected Health Information for Research and Comply with the Privacy Rule?, NAT'L INSTITUTES HEALTH, http:/
/privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_oS.asp (last updated Feb. 2, 2007) [http://perma.cc
/SZ2Q-2N3Z]; see also 45 C.F.R. § I64.502(d) (2014); id. § I64.5I4(b)(2)(i) (enumerating eighteen
identifiers, the removal of which renders what would otherwise be protected health information
"de-identifi[ed]," id. § I64.5I4(a), and outside the scope of the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. I04-I9I, I IO Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)); OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH
PROTS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING
CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS (200S), http://www.hhs.gov
/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html [http://perma.cc/2V7C-3SYU] (reaffirming that the review and consent
obligations ordinarily applicable to federally funded research do not apply to research using biological specimens that are not "individually identifiable").
On September 2, 2015, sixteen federal agencies and departments, including the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), released a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend and
update the Common Rule, which governs most federally funded human subjects research (and all
HHS-funded human subjects research). See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
HHS Announces Proposal to Update Rules Governing Research on Study Participants (Sept. 2,
20 IS), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/20I5pres/09/20 150902 b.html [http://perma.cc/N42C-2N2S];
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, So Fed. Reg. 53,933 (proposed Sept. S, 2015)
(to be codified in scattered titles of the Code of Federal Regulations). Under the proposed rule,
written consent will be required for secondary research using biological samples, regardless of deidentification or anonymization. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra; see
also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, So Fed. Reg. at 53,936 (summarizing
major provision of the proposed rule); id. at 54,047 (setting out proposed section _.I02(e) (blank
in original) and defining "human subject" to include "a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research ... [0 ]btains, uses, studies, or analyzes
biospecimens"). However, such consent may be broad, applying to all future research projects,
rather than permitting potential participants to consent to some research while refusing other research. See id. at 53,936 ("[I]nformed consent would generally be required for secondary research
with a biospecimen (for example, part of a blood sample that is left over after being drawn for
clinical purposes), even if the investigator is not being given information that would enable him or
her to identify whose biospecimen it is. Such consent would not need to be obtained for each specific research use of the biospecimen, but rather could be obtained using a 'broad' consent form in
which a person would give consent to future unspecified research uses."); id. at 54,053-54 (setting
out proposed section _.1 I6(c), describing broad consent to secondary research of biospecimens).
The proposed rule would not alter the HIPAA Privacy Rule standard for de-identification.
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The cases of bodies and organs, breast milk, and genetic information are in many ways importantly distinct. They arise under significantly different legal regimes and social conventions. IS They differently preclude or allow the body-product supplier to consent to the
subsequent sale of their body parts to others.19
And yet treatment of each body product echoes a common theme
and difficulty. In each of these instances, bodies and body parts either
legally or effectively have been reduced to the status of nonproperty in
the hands of the individuals from whom they come. Yet the same bodies and body parts are most certainly property - and valuable property at that - in the hands of all who follow, including medical and research institutions, private biobanks, and other businesses. In other
words, in America, bodies and body parts are not property, except
when they are.
Endless ink has been spilled debating whether those who provide
body products for medical or research uses should be entitled to compensation, in a free market or otherwise. 20 In many instances, prohibitions have been deemed necessary to protect both suppliers and recipients: Suppliers, because they may be of limited economic means and
may therefore be exploited to participate in efforts not otherwise consistent with their wellbeing or desiresP Recipients, because payment
may "crowd[] out" otherwise altruistic donors and leave only poor suppliers who are more likely to have and to hide a negative medical history.22 Indeed, in the ordinary telling, the history of America's prohibition on property in the body (at least for the sources of those bodies
and their parts) can be traced back to a single book, Professor Richard

18 For an analysis of the distinctions in legal treatment of bodies and organs, and the market
consequences, see generally Harrington & Sayre, supra note 4. For an examination of the history
and current status of the markets in breastfeeding, human milk, and infant formula, see
Fentiman, supra note II, at 35-75. For a discussion of current regulations governing human research subjects and an argument to extend those regulations to cover human DNA sequencing,
see Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-identified, 3I2 SCIENCE 370 (2006).
19 See sources cited supra note I8.
20 For a recent collection of articles exploring the issue of compensation for body products, see
Symposium, Organs and Inducements, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 20I4, at i. See also
Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing Ethical and Efficient Legal
Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARY. J.L. & TECH. IIg, I32-35 (200g) (discussing the ethical and legal issues raised by the commercialization of body products); Lynette Reid, Natalie
Ram & R. Blake Brown, Compensation for Gamete Donation: The Analogy with Jury Duty, I6
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 35 (2007) (examining whether gamete donation can be
analogized to jury duty and viewed as either a public service or public duty).
21 See 1. Glenn Cohen, Regulating the Organ Market: Normative Foundations for Market Regulation, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 3, 20I4, at 71, 75-79 (explaining the normative argument against the sale of organs based on concerns over coercion, undue influence, and exploitation).
22 Id. at 74-75.
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Titmuss's The Gift Relationship, which argued that paying blood donors led to poorer quality blood.23
But in her recent book, Banking on the Body, Professor Kara
Swanson reveals a more complicated story, one in which the body
bank arose as "more than a mere metaphor" (p. 238). Swanson surveys
the history of the body bank, which began with blood but went on to
shape American law and nonlegal norms governing many forms of
body-product exchange. In exploring this history, Swanson invites
readers to consider "how to move beyond the body bank and the legal
straitjacket that is its legacy to focus on the ends of body product exchange rather than the means" (p. 243).
Part I of this Review assesses the major contributions of Swanson's
book, namely Swanson's account of the concept of the body "bank"
from its origins in 1937 to the present day. In the course of this history, Swanson makes two more profound points. First, her historical account reveals that, for many years, paid blood sellers were not persons
to fear or the desperate poor we worry about today. Second, Swanson
demonstrates that compensated "donors" offered benefits to medical
professionals - and body-product recipients - not available with altruistic donors. In light of this history, Swanson closes with a call to
reconsider the prohibition on payments for body products, concluding
that historical experience establishes that "[b]ody products are property"
(p. 243)·

Swanson briefly recognizes that the history of the biobank impacts
the way in which interests in body parts are constructed, not only for
purposes of medical treatment, but also for research (pp. 244-45).
Swanson invokes the case of John Moore, in which the Supreme Court
of California famously refused even to recognize a patient's property
interest in the cells taken from his body and subsequently used in research without the patient's knowledge (pp. 244-45).24 But Swanson
says little more on the subject. This Review picks up where Swanson
leaves off. Part II establishes that the use of body products in research
is relevant to Swanson's tale, for the use of body products in research
and in clinical care are inextricably linked and discussions in both con23 See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP Iso-52, 157 (I970); Claudia Niza,
Burcu Tung & Theresa M. Marteau, Incentivizing Blood Donation: Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis to Test Titmuss' Hypotheses, 32 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 94I, 941-42 (2013) (describing the
influence of Richard Titmuss's The Gift Relationship); Robert Pinker, From Gift Relationships to
Quasi-markets: An Odyssey Along the Policy Paths of Altruism and Egoism, 40 Soc. POL'y &
ADMIN. IO, 13 (2006); see also ALBERT R. JaNSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 206 (I998) (asserting that the ideas in The Gift Relationship, "together with the life-saving drama of transplantation and the American predilection for voluntary assistance to others in need," gave rise to the
no-compensation model Congress adopted in the National Organ Transplant Act).
24 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (holding that Moore's
complaint against his physician and other defendants did not state a cause of action for conversion).
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texts about payment for body products are often animated by similar
concerns.
Finally, Part III moves beyond Swanson's historical account of the
clinical body bank, demonstrating that the research realm offers both
productive solutions and degrading depersonalization not yet seen in
the medical market in body products. The research realm may provide guidance for "how to appropriately regulate body products as a
type of property currently exchanged in many ways for many purposes" (p. 243). A shift toward greater parity between body-product producers and others in the supply chain need not entail a market-free
zone or a free market. Rather, policies and lived experiences in research body banking offer property or quasi-property regimes that
embrace the civic property approach for which Swanson advocates.
Already there are the seeds of such developments in some clinical settings as well. In addition to guidance, however, the research realm
sounds a note of caution. Its practices hint at further alienation of
body products from their sources, to which the clinical body bank may
yet succumb in the name of progress.
Ultimately, this Review concludes that Swanson's book serves a
critical function by providing a rich account of how the United States
ended up with the body banking system it has, even if Swanson herself
does not delve deeply into how that history informs and differs from
that of biobanking for research. In tandem with the complementary
experiences of research body banking, Swanson's work makes plain
that treating body products as nonproperty - but only for their
sources - disserves both medical and research practices by inflicting
injury on the ethical and effective governance of body banks. Doubtless, Swanson's work will inspire other scholars to question whether
the body banking system we have now accurately reflects our values,
rather than just the circumstances of history.
I. SITUATING THE BODY BANK

In Banking on the Body, Swanson offers a historical answer for
why American law and nonlegal norms often prevent the sources of
body products - like blood, milk, and kidneys - from gaining remuneration for parting with these valuable resources. As Swanson recognizes, others in the chain of body-product exchange are compensated
for their efforts; moreover, "[r]efusing to acknowledge markets in body
parts has not stopped market allocation of these medical therapeutics"
(p. 4). In order to understand why body-product exchanges for money
are "consider[ed] tainted and bad" (p. 4), Swanson unravels the history
of the concept of the body "bank" itself.
In recounting this history, Swanson richly explores the foundation,
growth, and change over time in banks of two principal kinds: blood
and breast milk. Swanson closes with some discussion about two oth-
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er kinds of body banks, for sperm and (very briefly) eggs, though this
discussion is far less developed than Swanson's account of blood and
milk banking (pp. 198-237). Swanson capably builds, and sometimes
critiques, multiple themes underlying body-product exchange, some of
which have already received scholarly attention elsewhere. 25 These
themes include the ways in which banking institutions have perpetuated gendered expectations for men and women participating in bodyproduct exchange,26 as well as the troubling role played by racial discrimination, particularly in the history of blood banking (pp. 64-65).27
Important though these themes are, the focus of this Review is a different, although related, theme - one indicating that paying bodyproduct providers may yield better, not worse, resources for both
banks and their providers. Accordingly, this Review sets forth only a
brief overview of Swanson's narrative before focusing more closely on
this point.
Identifying when the terms "bank" and "banking" came to apply to
the storage and use of human body parts is, Swanson explains, the
easy part (p. 5). In 1937, Dr. Bernard Fantus "borrowed the term bank
from the world of finance to describe the organization of stored blood
in his hospital, which he sought to manage like money in the bank"
(p. 5). At the time, providers of blood for transfusion often were paid
professionals, and their services frequently were beyond the means of
Fantus's largely low-income patients (p. 8). Where a paid blood provider was too expensive, patients and their physicians frequently prevailed upon the patient's family and friends (p. 49). Even so, a donor
might not be found, as when no volunteer had a matching blood type
to the patient or there was insufficient time to properly type a potential blood donor (pp. 49-50).

25 See 1. Glenn Cohen, My Body. My Bank, 93 TEX. L. REV. 953 (20I5) (reviewing KARA W.
SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY (20I4)) (discussing themes of gender and race as well as,
inter alia, Swanson's exploration of the relationship between product liability law and the development of understandings of bio-property in Banking on the Body).
26 Swanson notes the consistent association between paid body-product exchange and men on
the one hand, and uncompensated gifting and women on the other (p. 240). Swanson looks at
how, from the early days of blood transfusion, physicians and institutions expressed a preference
for male blood sellers (pp. 4I-44), and also observes that the growth of female blood donors coincided with the move to uncompensated blood donation during World War II (pp. 74-75). Professor Glenn Cohen presses Swanson on this point, arguing that Swanson "misses an opportunity to
more deeply examine the ways in which various body banks reinforce but also subvert gender
narratives over time." Cohen, supra note 25, at I006.
27 Swanson describes how racial discrimination became embedded in blood banking, even as
the institutions establishing and operating blood banks acknowledged that there was "no valid
objection on biologic or physiologic grounds to the transfusion of patients of one race with blood
from donors of another" (p. 65) (quoting Mark M. Ravitch, The Blood Bank of the Johns Hopkins
Hospital, IrS JAMA I71, I71 (I940)).

20 1 5]

BODY BANKING FROM THE BENCH TO THE BEDSIDE

499

The innovation of shelf-stable stored blood, however, enabled physicians to separate the time of blood collection from the time of blood
use (pp. 52-53, 55). Fantus's bank embraced stored blood - a controversial position at the time, but an essential element of the banking
model (pp. 54-56). By severing the tie between blood provider and
blood user, Fantus's bank was able to accept and make use of blood
from any healthy provider, regardless of whether that provider
matched any particular patient (p. 57). Each department in the hospital was responsible for "deposit[ing]," over time, the same volume of
blood it "withdr[ ew]" to treat its patients (p. 57).
The hospital, in turn, extended the banking metaphor to patients
directly (pp. 58-59). Patients were instructed that anyone "who had
received blood had been 'lent' the blood by the bank and 'owed' a return deposit to aid another patient" (p. 58). In Fantus's bank, therefore, debts for blood could be discharged through the provision of a reciprocal volume of blood, by a patient's family member or by the
patient at a later date (p. 56).
Fantus's bank thus did not create a commercial market in human
blood. Instead, the bank described a method of accounting for blood
and ensuring an adequate supply to all, overseen and administered by
medical professionals for the common good (p. 57). The key to the
bank was balancing withdrawals and deposits (p. 62). As Fantus told
his colleagues, "[t]he term 'blood bank' is not a mere metaphor"
(P·57).28
The concept of the bank spread quickly, first to blood banks
throughout the United States and then to body banks of other kinds,
including mothers' milk stations (pp. r62, r65-66). By r939, medical
treatises were already describing and endorsing blood banking along
the lines laid out by Fantus (p. 62). By the r940S, what were previously known as "milk stations" or "milk bureaus" similarly adopted the
language of the bank (pp. r62-68). But while the institutions collecting and distributing breast milk made use of the popular terminology,
they applied the metaphor of the bank only loosely (p. r66). After all,
strict debits and credits were not possible in the milk bank (p. r63).
Swanson recounts that paid sellers became a feared entity as the result of the confluence of several subsequent developments in the regulation of blood banks. First, in the post-World War II era, battles
raged between the Red Cross and community blood banks that took
Fantus's blood bank metaphor ever more literally (pp. 94-99). While
the Red Cross advocated against charging patients for units of blood,
either in money or in blood, community blood banks and affiliated or-

28 The author quotes Bernard Fantus, The Therapy of the Cook County Hospital: Blood
Preservation, I09 JAMA 128, 128 (1937).
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ganizations emphasized the need for individuals to keep their blood
"accounts" balanced (p. I07). These banks took Fantus's language at
its word, arguing that blood should be treated like "silver teaspoons"
for which a patient must pay (p. 113).29 "Replacement donors" became
the laudable figure of the day for these banks, providing blood today
to secure a credit against a future blood debt (p. IOg).
In addition to these interinstitutional tensions, the blood-asteaspoons analogy spawned difficulties of its own for the medical establishment. Patients began to sue physicians and hospitals for blood
transfusions gone wrong, arguing that that they were victims of defective products (p. 121). The Federal Trade Commission investigated
and issued a complaint against Kansas City's nonprofit blood banks,
asserting unfair trade practices (p. 132). Medical backlash against
these and other forms of liability prompted blood banks and their affiliated medical professionals to quickly reassess their rhetoric (p. 121).
Several states enacted "blood shield" laws, which "defin[ed] banked
blood as part of the 'service' of providing medical care rather than a
possibly 'unreasonably dangerous' 'product'" (p. 121).30 And blood
banks began to move away from professional donors as part of an effort "to break the connections between money and blood among supplier, bank, and recipient" (pp. 12 1-22). When fears about hepatitis in
the blood supply began to percolate in the Ig50s and Ig60s (pp. 12425), the professional donor came under further attack. Media drew
links from "paid blood suppliers" to donors from the "wrong side of the
tracks" and from there to "poverty" and "disease" (p. 146). That image
persisted, despite mixed evidence about whether paid or philanthropic
blood donors were more likely to contribute hepatitis as well as blood
(p. 146).
In this shifting milieu, Richard Titmuss's The Gift Relationship
framed the debate over America's blood supply not as about whether
patients should pay, but about whether providers should be paid
(p. 122). The influence of Titmuss's book was significant. Indeed, The
Gift Relationship has been described as "an established classic in the
literature of social policy," giving rise "to a debate which, in its intensity, had as much to do with the drawing as with the donation of
blood."31 By focusing on the blood provider and denominating our
choices as between treating blood as gift or as commodity, Titmuss's

29 The author quotes Leon E. Mermod & Hazel H. Bond, Blood Program of Hawaii, in PROCEEDINGS OF BLOOD BANK INSTITUTE 25, 30 (1947) (statement of an administrator of the
Blood Bank of Hawaii).
30 The author quotes Patricia Kussman, Annotation, Validity. Construction. and Application of
Blood Shield Statutes, 75 A.L.R.5th 229, § 2(a) (2000); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
31 Pinker, supra note 23, at 13; see also sources cited supra note 23.
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book constrained the scope of the debate that followed. And when the
first kidney transplants made hard organ donation possible, the
gift/commodity debate ruled the day (pp. 156-57). The result was the
National Organ Transplant Act,32 which prohibits the exchange of
"valuable consideration" for various organs (p. 157).33
Today, the gift/commodity dichotomy is embedded in law - at
least as far as the providers of raw materials are concerned (p. 241).
Organs, including bone marrow, may be gifted but not sold; blood and
milk may be, but typically are not, sold; gametes are frequently bought
and sold in a free market (pp. 240-41). Institutions facilitating each of
these exchanges call themselves banks, but Fantus's banking metaphor
hardly applies to any of them. These institutions remain free to buy
and sell their stock and trade, regardless of the price paid for the raw
material (p. 245).
Swanson concludes that the history of the body bank should
prompt a reconsideration of the prohibition on payments for certain
body products (pp. 245-5 I). As Swanson observes, historical experience makes plain that "[b]ody products are property. Body products
are appropriately civic property. Markets in body products can be
harnessed to serve communal goals. The professional donor can be a
safe and respected supplier of body products" (p. 243). Fantus's blood
bank was no "mere metaphor" (p. 57),34 but neither did it require resort to or reliance on pure free-market principles to allocate blood to
the highest buyer or from the lowest seller.
Along the way, moreover, Swanson makes two more profound
points. First, Swanson explains that paid providers of body products
have not always been associated with the desperate poor for whose
protection many payment restrictions exist (p. 246). Rather, for many
years before the paid blood seller became someone to fear, the "professional donor" was often a "heroic and respectable figure" (p. 42). These
men (and regular blood sellers typically were men) were "m[e]n of
business" (p. II5), using their bodies to earn family income not just at
the office but also at the hospital blood bank (pp. 43-44). Indeed,
some news articles identified blood selling as a business all its own,
sufficient to allow its "healthy, full-blooded" participants to earn a liv-

32 Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (l984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273, 274-274e
(20l2)).
33 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a); see also JONSEN, supra note 23, at 205-08 (recounting bioethical debates surrounding organ transplantation leading up to and following enactment of the National
Organ Transplant Act). See generally Mary Jo Festle, Enemies or Allies? The Organ Transplant
Medical Community, the Federal Government, and the Public in the United States, I967-2ooo, 65
J. HrsT. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 48, 59-62 (20ra) (explaining opposition to and support for the passage of the National Organ Transplant Act).
34 The author quotes Fantus, supra note 28.
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ing wage or tuition money (p. 43).35 These men were not "down-andouters" or poor "rovers," but "professionals" - and robust ones at that
(p. 43). Thus, blood sellers of the 1920S were "admirable physical specimens," from whom "any American would want blood" (p. 43).
Of course, not all accounts of paid blood sellers painted such a rosy
picture. As Swanson explains, alongside accounts lauding the professional were others denigrating that figure (p. 47). One magazine article recounted blood sellers "liv[ing] in a squalid boardinghouse," who
were "not eager young students or budding salesmen but broken failures" (p. 47).36 Swanson's insight, however, is that the early days of
blood transfusion saw multiple narratives for paid providers of body
products, not all of which were negative.
Moreover, not all paid sellers of blood and milk were interested in
personal gain. For instance, members of the Greenleafton Reformed
Church in Preston, Minnesota, signed up in droves to sell their blood,
dedicating the proceeds to rebuild their church after a fire (p. 144).
As Fantus's banking metaphor spread, "replacement donors" joined
the professionals, accruing blood credits redeemable for future blood
needs (pp. 108-09, 113). Where the professional donor earned income
for his family by giving blood, "the working husband and father during the Cold War could provide for his family by purchasing blood
credits with his donation" (p. 114). Unlike the extraordinary men who
served as professional donors, the replacement donor was every responsible family man (p. 116). By giving blood as a "replacement donor," he was "showing the same fiscal responsibility and ability to care
for his family as he showed by maintaining a savings account" (p. 116).
In this sense, the individual giving blood for practical business reasons
was laudable, unlike the "shiftless minority" unable to pay for blood in
cash or in kind (p. I 17).
Similarly, a woman who sold her milk for pay was often lauded as
doing a "double charity," both providing milk needed by others and
helping to support herself and her family (p. 37).37 The shift from wet
nurses to bottled breast milk, in fact, accompanied a shift in the source
of breast milk for infants. While wet nurses often came from "among
the bottom rungs of society," physicians recruited sellers of bottled
breast milk from women of a higher socioeconomic status (p. 36).
These "healthy married mothers" (p. 36),38 like the men primarily involved in blood selling, were engaged in a "legitimate trade" and "profThe author quotes Louis Schwartz, Full-Blooded Donors, 8 HYGEIA I lO9, I lO9 (1930).
The author cites Charles V. Nemo, I Sell Blood, 31 AM. MERCURY 194, 194-98 (1934).
37 The author quotes B. Raymond Hoobler, An Experiment in the Collection of Human Milk
for Hospital and Dispensary Uses, 31 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS 171, 173 (I914).
38 The author quotes Fritz B. Talbot, An Organization for Supplying Human Milk, 199 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 6lO, 6lO (I928).
35

36
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itable business" in human milk, enabling their families to maintain or
even rise in socioeconomic status (p. 37).39
In sum, individuals who provided blood or milk expecting something in return, whether in cash or in kind, were often admirable figures in earlier days of blood banking. In ways unfamiliar today, body
banking for personal benefit was not an activity for the poor or desperate. Rather, at times it was a matter of good sense and familial
responsibility.
Second, Swanson chronicles how compensated donors, whether remunerated with cash or credit, offered physicians - and body-product
recipients - material benefits not available with altruistic donors.
Swanson demonstrates that remunerated donors were more readily
susceptible to medical oversight. In particular, physicians could demand more information, blood tests, and physical inspection. Local
hospitals routinely maintained registries of paid blood sellers who were
regularly available, blood typed, and screened for disease (p. 44). The
Mayo Clinic's one thousand registered blood sellers each were required
to undergo "a general physical examination, urinalysis, and a syphilis
test every six months" (p. 44). New York City's Blood Transfusion
Betterment Association maintained a registry of professional donors
available to multiple city hospitals (p. 45). The Association rejected
roughly one-quarter of applicants for the "job of blood seller," "often
on the basis of 'unprepossessing habits' or 'unpleasant personal appearance'" (p. 46).40 These blood banks, whether based at hospitals or
in freestanding medically supervised institutions, "sought to standardize and control donor bodies, striving to make a safe and reliable blood
supply available to [their] member medical institutions" (p. 46).
Similarly, paying new mothers for their milk enabled physicians to
require women to express milk under medical supervision (pp. 36-37).
Milk stations in the 1920S "enforced strict hygienic procedures and
monitored the mothers" expressing milk on site (p. 33). Women
washed (or were washed) under supervision, garbed themselves in
gowns (often from head to toe), and submitted to physical examination
before expressing milk for pay (p. 33). When the Detroit milk bureau
permitted certain "reliable" women to express milk at home and send
it to the hospital, it paid less for that milk than for milk provided on
site and under supervision (p. 33). Payment, in other words, yielded
stricter control.

The author quotes James A. Tobey, A New Foster-Mother, 7 HVGEIA II IO, I IIO-I I (I929).
The author quotes E.H. Lewinski Corwin, Blood Transfusions and Donors, 4 BULL. AM.
Hosp. ASS'N II6, II9 (I930). Of course, what constituted "unprepossessing habits" or "unpleasant personal appearances" were likely to be largely subjective inquiries that could provide cover
for bias.
39
40
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Many of the physicians involved in these efforts also sought to
make the pay for milk substantial enough that a woman could "support herself and her child," without needing to return immediately to
work (p. 37).41 Others required new mothers to bring their own infants to the hospital at appointed times (p. 37). Through this requirement, women also obtained new-baby medical care that otherwise
would have frequently been unaffordable (p. 37). Payment thus permitted physicians not only to exercise greater control, but also to use
that control to achieve better outcomes for all involved.
II. RECOGNIZING THE RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH
In winding her tale to a close, Swanson touches briefly on how her
history of the clinical body bank intertwines with that of the research
biobank (pp. 244-45). Swanson explains that "[o]ne perverse result of
the blood bank battles and the resulting market backlash ... has been
a line of legal reasoning that denies property interests in body products" (p. 244). In order to avoid the language - and liability - of
market products, courts and legislatures have reconceived of body
products as "nonproperty" (p. 244). But this "nonproperty" lens is limited, and the result has been "a loss of supplier control over disembodied body products as well as over any profits that come from their
commercialization" (p. 244).
It is here that Swanson invokes, in a single paragraph, the case of
John Moore (pp. 244-45). In that case, the California Supreme Court
held that a patient, John Moore, could not maintain a conversion action against his physician, related researchers, and others who had
taken tissue removed from Moore's body for treatment purposes and
used that tissue for independent research and commercial purposes. 42
The court reached that holding by concluding that Moore had no
property right in his tissue once removed from his body, and thus that
no property had been converted when that tissue was subsequently
used in research without Moore's knowledge or consent. 43 Swanson
recognizes that, for both medical and research suppliers of body products, "[o]nly the supplier of the body products is left uncompensated,
prevented by law from profiting from the act of creating what becomes
valuable property" (p. 245). Thus, Swanson links the history of estranging blood, milk, and other donors from their body products to the
similar fate of those providing tissue for research purposes (p. 245).
This acknowledgment of the research body bank, though telling,
leaves much untold about the role of research body banking in the
41
42

43

The author quotes Hoobler, supra note 37, at 173.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,487-97 (Cal. 1990).
Id.
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banking story more broadly. As Professor Glenn Cohen observes in his
own review of Swanson's book, "one of the most important modern
forms of body banking is not for clinical use at all but for research
use."44 Engagement with the research body bank intersects Swanson's
clinically focused project in at least three ways.
First, the research body bank is a body bank that might well be
relevant to the history Swanson sets out to tell. As Cohen has observed, the contours of the biobank are in many ways more like the financial bank that first inspired Fantus than the blood bank Fantus actually created. 45 The initial body bank Swanson so ably describes in
her book latched on to the banking metaphor to establish a method of
recordkeeping and asset management (P.57). In so doing, Fantus's
bank, and others like it, borrowed from the financial realm the depositor's perspective. Just as one may not borrow without repayment or
withdraw without deposit in a financial bank, so too with the blood
bank (p. 58).
But banks are not merely lockboxes in which individuals deposit
their savings. Banks are also independent institutions, whose principal
revenue does not come from holding funds or connecting borrowers
and lenders.46 The fact that most banks pay interest on deposited
funds, rather than charge fees for their service, belies such a model.
Rather, financial banking makes its money by investing deposited
funds, hopefully to greater gains than that paid out in interest in the
interimY In other words, we can view banks from the perspective of
the depositor, who wants to know she can withdraw equivalent funds
in the future, or from the perspective of the bank-as-institution, which
wants to use its deposits to its own ends.
Research biobanks operate in a manner somewhat similar to this
second view of the bank. These banks invest the human tissue or genetic information they have acquired into research and other endeavors, with the hope that such research will bear financial fruit greater
than the cost of collecting and maintaining the banks' inventories.
Modern revenues in blood banking suggest that the institutional perspective is at work in that field as well. 48
44 Cohen, supra note 25, at 988. Cohen does not engage in a substantive discussion of the research body bank, but does identify the lack of such discussion in Swanson's book. I d. at 988-90.
45 I d. at 989.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Byron Harris, Blood Business Pits Charities Against One Another, WFAA (Feb.
I8, 20I5, ro:23 PM), http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/local/investigates/20I5/02/I8!carter-blood
-care--american-red-cross-ge neral-blood -blood-dona tionsl 236354 IS [http://perma. ccl5 P83 -4AL E];
Dan Tracy, Salaries Rise at Merged Blood Bank, Even as Revenues Fall, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Oct. 20, 20l2, 7:34 PM), http://articies.oriandosentinel.com/20l2-ro-20/business/os-one-blood
-florida-day I -20 I 2 l020_l_anne-chinoda-blood-bank-oneblood [http://perma.cc/M5J 2-BFCV].
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To be sure, the analogy between the financial bank and the research body bank is imperfect, just as it is for the clinical body bank
Swanson discusses. The research body bank hews most closely to the
institutional perspective of banking, and shares less with the depositor
approach. That is necessarily so, as the sources of research tissue typically do not retain the right to reclaim their tissue from the bank. 49
Indeed, in many instances individuals are legally barred from obtaining the return of their excised biological materials, as federal and many
state laws have classified such materials as hazardous waste. 50 The
depositor perspective is not entirely absent from the research body
bank, however. In one prominent case, the Eighth Circuit held that
tissue providers retained the right to request destruction of their cells
so that they would no longer be research subjects against their wilLS1
Similarly, 23andMe permits its customers who consent to research participation to opt out later.52
By leaving research biobanks out of her history, Swanson has given
us an incomplete account of the body bank. Moreover, by hewing to
the depositor perspective, Swanson overlooks the institutional perspective of banking that could bring additional richness to her analysis of
property in the body.
Second, Swanson's history of the clinical body bank is also relevant
to matters of research governance. These two fields are inextricably
linked. To state the obvious, clinical treatment often results from medical research,53 and medical research is designed to develop new clini49 See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Noticeably absent from the
record is any mention the [research participants] ever were informed they could physically withdraw or request the return of their biological samples.").
50 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § I91O.1030(b) (2013) (defining "Regulated Waste" as including "[a]ny
unfixed tissue or organ (other than intact skin) from a human (living or dead)"); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7054-4 (West 2015) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable
anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the state department [of health services] to protect the public health and safety.");
Catalona, 490 F.3d at 676 ("[I]n no event could the samples physically be returned to their donors.
Federal and state regulations prohibit such a result by defining excised body tissue and blood as
hazardous substances or infectious waste, and by articulating the proper disposal method.");
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,491-92 (Cal. 1990) (discussing how Moore's
claim of a continuing property interest in his excised cells was undermined by California health
and safety codes regulating the disposal of human tissue).
51 Catalona, 490 F.3d at 675 ("[T]he [research participant] is entitled to request his biological
materials no longer be used, and under the terms of the brochures (and some of the consent forms
as well), the materials would be identified and destroyed upon request.").
52 23ANDME, supra note IS ("Research participation is an opt-in choice during the kit registration process .... You can opt-out of research at any time.").
53 For instance, Jonas Salk first developed the polio vaccine to aid in the clinical prevention of
polio; the effectiveness of that vaccine was validated through laboratory testing using He La cells.
See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 93-97 (2010). The
HeLa cells, in turn, derived from a sliver of cancerous cervical tissue taken from Henrietta Lacks,
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cal treatments. 54 Indeed, the line between clinical treatment and medical research is sometimes murky.55 Though not part of controlled research studies, early efforts to transfuse blood, for instance, were "risky
and experimental" (p. r6). Recent efforts to increase the availability of
experimental drugs and treatments to terminally ill patients similarly
straddle the line between research and treatment. 56
The research/treatment relationship also lies at the heart of
biobanking. As set forth above, biobanks are valuable because of the
information they hold and the research they can supportY Cells taken
from Henrietta Lacks in r 95 r during the course of medical treatment
(without consent, much less payment, for their use in research) were
valuable because they gave rise to the first immortal cell line, a new
material for research purposes. 58 The uses to which those cells were
put, moreover, multiplied their value exponentially. HeLa cells (from
Henrietta Lacks) "contributed to the development of a polio vaccine,
the discovery of human telomerase and countless other advances."59
Modern biobanks pursue the same research/treatment hybrid. 60 Lawsuits waged over ownership of biobank materials make plain not only
their value, but also the overlapping relationship between research and
treatment. For instance, in one case, a university and a former faculty
when she was a patient at The Johns Hopkins Hospital. Id. at 33, 40-41. Numerous other medical advances have also developed from research involving human biological tissue. See, e.g., id.
at 3 I6.
54 The relationship between medical research and clinical treatment is not always positive.
Advances in medical research may also hinder clinical treatment. For instance, prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., I33
S. Ct. 2 I07 (20I3), one survey reported that a quarter of responding laboratories had stopped offering or developing a genetic test in response to patent enforcement efforts. Mildred K. Cho et
aI., Special Article, Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing
Services,s J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 7 (2003). Fifty-three percent of responding laboratories reported that they had "decided not to develop or perform a test/service for clinical or research purposes because of a patent." Id. at 5. The Supreme Court's decision in Association for
Molecular Pathology held that naturally occurring genetic sequences may not be patented. I33
S. Ct. at 2 I I 1.
55 Cf, e.g., Editorial, How Can We Draw the Line Between Clinical Care and Medical Research?, 4 PLoS MED. 1707 (2007) (discussing ethical issues raised by the difficulty in distinguishing between clinical care and medical research).
56 See Rebecca Dresser, The "Right to Try" Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the
Access Debate, 93 TEX. L. REV. I63I, I632 & n.3 (20I5) (discussing these efforts and observing
that at least twelve states have enacted right-to-try laws, which allow terminally ill patients to
gain access to drugs not yet FDA approved).
57 See SKLOOT, supra note 53; sources cited supra note I2.
58 See generally SKLOOT, supra note 53 (discussing Lacks's life and illness, and scientists' subsequent use of her cells).
59 Ewen Callaway, Deal Done over HeLa Cell Line: Family of Henrietta Lacks Agrees to Release of Genomic Data, 500 NATURE I32, I32 (20I3).
60 Henderson et aI., supra note I, at 5, 7 (reporting that more than half of American research
biobanks include specimens obtained from clinical care, and that more than half also were "established primarily to facilitate research on a particular disease or type of disease," id. at 7).
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member fought over ownership of a biobank containing tissue samples
from men who had had their prostates removed as part of their medical treatment. 61 These men were patients first, became research subjects, and hoped to benefit from the fruits of that research in the end. 62
But the relationship between research and treatment goes deeper.
Institutions engaged in research have sometimes justified their nonpayment for body products by citing their research goals, while simultaneously charging high rates to others to use the treatments arising
from that research. For instance, Prolacta explains on its website that
it has "invested over 40 million dollars in research, clinical studies and
facilities to develop and test our human milk derived products. This
world class research and development would not have been possible in
a non-profit business model."63 This explanation makes little sense, as
world-class research is routinely conducted at nonprofit universities.
Nonetheless, Prolacta's research-based justification for its for-profit
status, coupled with its encouragement to women to provide raw human breast milk for little or no compensation, exposes an awkward
disjunction between (lack of) profit for sources of biological materials
and tissue sources and profit for others in the distribution chain similar to that seen in clinical body banking more broadly (p. 245).
Third, as with the clinical body bank, concerns about exploitation
of those with little information, education, or other options for obtaining income animate modern discussions about remuneration for providers of research tissue. 64 The literature on the buying and selling of
body products ("taboo trades") is extensive, and this Review can give
only a brief overview. 65 Concerns about exploitation are one of several
principal objections to body-product exchanges involving money.66
Exploitation is of concern when a transaction is harmful to one or both
parties. That is, we will say that an individual has been wrongly ex-

61 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing Washington University as
the owner of tissue and other samples provided to it under research programs overseen by a urology specialist, Dr. Catalona); see also Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc.,
264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing the conversion claim and finding
that individuals providing tissue and blood samples for research on Canavan disease made "donations to research without any contemporaneous expectations of return of the body tissue and genetic samples," id. at 1074).
62 See Brief of Appellant-Defendants Richard Ward, et al. at 40, Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (Nos.
06-2286 & 06-2301) ("[TJissue samples provide a record of the state of patients' cancer at the time
of their surgery. Comparison of such samples to later tissue biopsies can provide important information about the progress of the disease and response to treatment.").
63 PROLACTA BIOSCIENCE, supra note 7 (responding to the question: "Is Prolacta a for-profit
company?").
64 See, e.g., Donna Dickenson, Commentary, Commodification of Human Tissue: Implications
for Feminist and Development Ethics, 2 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 55 (2002).
65 For a more extensive overview, see Cohen, supra note 21, at 73-80.
66 See id. at 75-79.
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ploited if the buyer benefits from the transaction, the seller is harmed,
and the seller only agreed to the transaction due to some characteristic
of the seller, such as her poverty or age. 67 Absent that characteristic,
the seller "would not ordinarily be willing to agree."68 As Swanson observes, payment for blood suppliers receded as the public came to associate paid suppliers with "poverty" and the "wrong side of the
tracks" (p. 146) - socioeconomic conditions that may make an individual more susceptible to harmful exploitation. Concerns about exploitation may be of increasing importance in the clinical domain, given the growth of "transplant tourism. "69
Similar concerns about exploitation populate policy and discussion
about payments for research participation. Nearly all ethics and research organizations interacting with research biobanks have
"adopt[ed] some version of a noncommercialization position," with
some identifying the removal of human tissue specifically for profit as
immoral. 70 These commitments against payment for tissue may have
concrete policy applications. Thus, when in 2009 New York announced that it would permit state-funded researchers to pay women
to provide eggs for stem cell research, "critics worr[ied] that the move
could lead to the exploitation of women, especially poor women, who
tend not to be in demand for infertility donation."71 As with paid
blood sellers in the 1960s, paid egg providers are frequently the subject
of controversy and criticism. 72 Where eggs are to be used for clinical
reproductive purposes, professional organizations like the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) have established guidelines regarding the amount that egg providers may be paid, responding to
fears of exploitation. 73 Relatedly, where eggs are to be used for reId. at 78.
Id.
69 See 1. Glenn Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of International Markets for Organs, 41 J-L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 282 (20r3) (defining "transplant tourism" as "travel
abroad to purchase organs for transplant," id. at 269, and observing that transplant tourism is an
"increasingly common response to worldwide shortages of organs," id. at 282).
70 ROBERT F. WEIR & ROBERT S. OLICK, WITH JEFFREY C. MURRAY, THE STORED TISSUE ISSUE r23 (2004); see also B.M. Knoppers & C.M. Laberge, Research and Stored Tissues:
Persons as Sources, Samples as Persons?, 274 JAMA r806, r806 (r995) ("[I]nternationally individual agreements to share in profits with the [tissue providers] are often considered morally repugnant.").
71 Rob Stein, N. Y. to Pay for Eggsfor Stem Cell Research, WASH. POST (June 26, 2009), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2oo9/06/ 251AR2 00906 250 r 93 r_pf.h tml [h ttp:1 I
perma.cc/DF64-T98P].
72 See, e.g., David Tuller, Payment Offers to Egg Donors Prompt Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (May
ro, 20ro), http://www.nytimes.com/20ro/05/rr/health/rreggs.html.
73 See Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte
Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305 (2007). SART is an affiliated society of ASRM and has
adopted the ASRM statement on financial compensation for egg donors as its own. See Ethics
Committee Documents, SOC'Y ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., http://www.sart.org/EthicsReports
67

68
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search, concerns about exploitation feature prominently. In both instances, policymakers and the public have expressed uneasiness at the
buying and selling of human eggs and about the choices that women
may make when substantial sums of money are on the table.
Moreover, here too international practices may heighten concerns
about exploitation. Research may be conducted in one part of the
world, where labor and resources are relatively inexpensive, while the
products produced from that research serve the needs and interests of
those in wealthier countries. 74 In this way, as with transplant tourism,
the burdens on those producing tissue for research may fall on distinctly
different populations than those who reap the benefits of that research. 75
Given the scope of Swanson's historical project, it is understandable that Swanson does not explore these links between the clinical
and research domains. Nonetheless, her book provides a basis for
delving into these matters more deeply.
For one thing, Swanson's historical account of the clinical body
bank gives new reason to question whether exploitation of society's
most vulnerable is a necessary outcome when payment, in cash or other forms, is provided. 76 The history of the "professional" and "replacement" donor indicates that remuneration, in cash or in kind, can
give rise to a healthier and more predictable population of bodyproduct suppliers than can a reliance on unremunerated donations
alone. Moreover, that history suggests that a remunerated population
may well be equally as financially established as an unremunerated
population of donors. The same may well be true for supplying the
research body bank. In the context of disease-specific research, for instance, providing remuneration in some form may yield broader participation from discrete disease-afflicted populations - or encourage such
populations to grant researchers access to basic research material. 77
[http://perma.cc/HF64-7PVV] (linking to ASRM's statement among SART's Ethics Committee
documents). Some oocyte donors have challenged these guidelines in a class action antitrust suit.
See Class Action Complaint, Kamakahi v. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., No. 4:II-CV-OI781 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 12, 201 I); Ashby Jones, Putting a Price on a Human Egg, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2015,
7: 14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/putting-a-price-on-a-human-egg-143 795 245 6.
74 See Dickenson, supra note 64, at 57-63 (arguing that the human eggs required for therapeutic cloning research are likely to come from women in the Southern Hemisphere and support research in the Northern Hemisphere, with the fruits of that research similarly available only to
those in the North); see also Implementation of Proposition 7I, the Stem Cell Research and Cures
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, S. Subcomm. on Stem Cell Research Oversight, and
the Assemb. Comm. on Health, 2005-06 Sess. (Cal. 2005) (statement of Francine Coeytaux, ProChoice Alliance for Responsible Research), http://shea.senate.ca.gov/sites/shea.senate.ca.gov/files
IPROP _7I_OVERSIGHT_COEYTAUX.doc [http://perma.cc/TZ8E-D6QQ] (noting that so long
as financial inducement is available, most human eggs obtained for therapeutic cloning research
will come from poor women).
75 See Ram, supra note 20, at 133.
76 See supra pp. 50I-02.
77 See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, just as paying suppliers of blood and milk banks enabled
physicians to exercise greater medical oversight of those suppliers, payment may yield similarly increased medical oversight where the research body bank is at issue. Consider the use of human eggs for research. As set forth above, concerns about paying women for their
eggs often include concerns about exploitation. 78 Yet payment may in
fact have the opposite result. With payment, those responsible for
screening potential egg providers may have a unique opportunity to
ensure the wellbeing of the women in their care. 79 For instance, a
broader potential donor pool might permit screening to ensure that egg
providers are healthy enough to undergo egg retrieval, understand the
procedures at issue, and share the goals of the research to be completed. 80 While nonpayment is one means of shaping the pool of potential
egg providers, donor screening and oversight is another - and one
perhaps more finely tuned to the needs of both researchers and egg
providers. 81 Thus, as in the clinical context, payment might well permit researchers, and the physicians often responsible for collecting research tissue in the first instance, to use that payment to achieve better
outcomes for all.

III. CLINICAL LESSONS FROM THE RESEARCH BODY BANK
Just as Swanson's account of clinical body banking for blood and
milk can help inform our research governance, our experiences with
biobanking for research purposes offer insight into future paths that
clinical body banking might take. Here, biobanking practices offer
cause for both hope and alarm.
Biobanking gives reason to hope for the future of clinical body
banking by providing concrete examples of how the contributions of
See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
Swanson discusses how physicians involved in milk banking sometimes provided new baby
care along with collecting milk from donor mothers, and set payments for milk donations at levels
substantial enough to permit a new mother to "support herself and her child," rather than merely
at the lowest price a market might bear (pp. 36-37) (quoting Hoobler, supra note 37, at I73).
80 Swanson's work discusses the increased oversight - and rejection rate - that some blood
banks were able to exercise in working with professional donors (p. 46).
81 Relying on nonpayment to shape the population of women willing and qualified to provide
eggs for research may indicate, in addition to a concern about exploitation, a lack of trust that the
researchers and physicians involved in such research will not engage in harmful exploitation.
Such concerns are not without foundation. Indeed, some researchers, and physicians involved in
research, have acted in seriously unethical ways. See, e.g., JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (r993); Vicki S. Freimuth et aI., African Americans' Views
on Research and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 52 SOc. SCI. & MED. 797, 799 (200r) ("Abuse of
human subjects involved in research has been well documented, and modern examples include
the Human Radiation Experiments conducted by the US Government, birth control studies on
women of color, the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital and the Willowbrook Hospital
cases, among others .... ").
78
79
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individuals providing the raw materials for research may be recognized without adopting a pure market for such materials. The research realm has, on occasion, embraced relationships with tissue providers that are neither noncompensatory nor purely market based in
nature. Indeed, at least one prominent international bioethics organization has sanctioned benefit sharing as an ethical part of human tissue research. The Human Genome Organization (HUGO) is an international organization of scientists involved in human genetics that
seeks to facilitate effective, efficient, and ethical research on the human and other genomes. 82 Like other bodies' ethical guidelines for research involving humans, HUGO's Statement on the Principled Conduct of Genetics Research recommends prohibiting "undue inducement
through compensation for individual participants, families, and populations."83 Yet the Statement clarifies that this recommendation does
not encompass "agreements with individuals, families, groups, communities or populations that [foresee] technology transfer, local training, joint ventures, provision of health care or on information infrastructures, reimbursement of costs, or the possible use of a percentage
of any royalties for humanitarian purposes."84 HUGO thus distinguishes between direct compensation and benefit sharing, though both
are forms of remuneration.
HUGO's recognition that remuneration may playa role in ethical
and effective research practices opens the door to imagining various
forms of alternative compensation, some of which have already gained
a foothold in modern research practice. For instance, PXE International, a patient advocacy group for individuals suffering from pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE), a rare genetic disease, successfully negotiated for co-ownership of any patents that resulted from study of blood
samples collected from PXE patients and their families. 85 PXE International was able to secure this arrangement by assembling its own
biobank and withholding access to its resources until researchers

82 See Human Genome Org., Ethical, Legal, and Soc. Issues Comm., Statement on the Principled Conduct of Genetic Research, 6 EUBIOS J. ASIAN & INT'L BIOETHICS 59, 59-60 (I996),
http://www.eubios.info/HUGO.htm [http://perma.cc/ME58-HBC4].
83 Id. (emphasis omitted).
84 I d. But see Ellen Wright Clayton et aI., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored
Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA I786, I789 (I995) (noting that some commentators "have expressed
concern that offering [tissue providers] a share of profits would be manipulative because the possibility that a profitable product will be developed from any particular research project is so
low").
85 See Ram, supra note 20, at I62; see also Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A
Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 6I WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 262-63 (2004); Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use
Their Influence in Deal over Gene Patent Terms, 407 NATURE 82I, 82I (2000).
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agreed that any resulting intellectual property rights would be
shared. 86
This approach, a form of benefit sharing, afforded tissue providers
at least two forms of important remuneration. First, because PXE International controlled access to its repository of human tissue, it gave
PXE International members, who were the sources of that tissue, a
seat at the table in determining which research projects would be conducted with their cells. 87 Securing a greater level of control over the
research conducted with their tissue may well have borne both dignitary and utilitarian fruit for research participants and researchers
alike. 88 Second, by conditioning access to the repository on contractual
agreements to share inventorship rights in any resulting patents, PXE
International secured a share of the rewards - financial, clinical, and
otherwise - resulting from completed research. 89 In so doing, PXE
International intentionally adopted the civic property model that
Swanson advocates in her book. PXE International "embraced the
notion of commodification, but only if it could be consciously subordinated to the needs and control of" the community of PXE patients and
their families. 90 The model established by PXE International has

86 Ram, supra note 20, at r62; see also Jon F. Merz et aI., Protecting Subjects' Interests in Genetics Research, 70 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 965, 966 (2002).
87 See Donna Dickenson, Alternatives to a Corporate Commons: Biobanking, Genetics and
Property in the Body, in PERSONS, PARTS AND PROPERTY 177, 191-92 (Imogen Goold et al.
eds., 2014). A seat at the table is not an ordinary occurrence. Indeed, the National Institutes of
Health made headlines when it gave a literal seat at the table to the descendants of Henrietta
Lacks in determining which research projects using the HeLa genome should be funded. See
Callaway, supra note 59, at 132.
88 See Ram, supra note 20, at 127 ("[Rjespect for the tissue provider's interest in control
emerges not only from considerations of respect for human dignity, but also from more consequentialist considerations about maximizing the amount of tissue available for research.").
89 I d. at 162; Merz, supra note 86, at 966. The contrast between the experience of PXE International and of participants in a biobank targeting Canavan disease could not be more striking.
In the latter case, families of sufferers of Canavan disease gave a research team access to a
biobank of their tissue samples. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc.,
264 F. Supp. 2d ro64, ro67 (S.D. Fla. 2003). The lead researcher subsequently obtained a comprehensive patent on the gene responsible for the disease. Id. The families - who had provided
the valuable tissue that made discovery of that gene (and gene variant) possible - lost a claim for
conversion against the researcher and his employer. I d. at ro76. A settlement ultimately exempted researchers and some laboratories from paying a royalty fee to use the patented gene. Dickenson,
supra note 87, at 193. Absent that settlement, however, a failure to negotiate contractual terms
explicitly and in advance would have left the providers of that valuable tissue without the right to
access the genetic information pertaining to Canavan disease.
90 Dickenson, supra note 87, at 191. Swanson discusses the civic property model in the context
of clinical body banking, but research body banking may, indeed, be a better fit. The fruits of the
research body bank may yield benefits - research discoveries and developments - that redound
to whole communities and populations. By contrast, the stores of the clinical body bank typically
benefit individuals one at a time: each blood bag comes from one individual and treats one individual. While the civic property model Swanson advocates still carries weight in suggesting how
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since spread, and so has its civic property approach: "PXE International has become a well-known model for the way it has leveraged its
control of the biobank qua biocapital in order to achieve collective
goals."91
Benefit sharing might offer a way to resolve the property dilemma
at the heart of the body bank. Benefit sharing compensates tissue
providers for their contributions, while minimizing the economic, and
potentially exploitative, incentive to provide tissue. There is good reason to believe such a model could be successful in banking body products other than for research purposes. The seeds of a benefit-sharing
approach are visible in the history of body banking Swanson recounts.
When members of the Greenleafton Reformed Church dedicated the
proceeds of their blood sales to rebuild their church after a fire, they
were seeking a form of remuneration other than cold, hard cash in
their own hands (p. 144). Although church members received individual cash payments in exchange for their blood, those payments were
dedicated to a community purpose - to the tune of $27,000 over eight
years (p. 144). In the 1950s, the Mayo Clinic categorized "church donors" (those designating their cash payments for such projects) separately from other "professional" and "replacement" donors (p. 144).
Indeed, the Clinic "reported a waiting list of groups hoping to join the
ranks of church donors" (p. 144). As with PXE International, the civic
property model Swanson advocates is also evident here.
The spectrum of possible remuneration schemes is broader still.
Replacement donors earning blood credits redeemable for future
health care needs, for instance, sought and received individual or familial benefits (p. I09). As Swanson explains, the replacement donor
embodied "the same fiscal responsibility and ability to care for his
family as he showed by maintaining a savings account" (p. 116). But
the benefits to replacement donors came in a nontraditional form of
compensation: standardized blood credits instead of cash. These exchanges thus offered remuneration to their participants that cannot
easily be categorized as relying on either market or gift exchange.
Modern kidney exchanges similarly defy categorization. 92 As described above, current federal law prohibits the transfer of a kidney
the stores of the clinical body bank might be collected and dispersed, that model nonetheless operates somewhat differently in the research context.
91 David E. Winickoff, Partnership in U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Property?, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 450 (2007); see also Dickenson, supra note 87, at 192-93 (discussing
subsequent biobanking efforts, including the Genetic Alliance, Science Commons, and Cancer
Commons).
92 See Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Essay, Custom, Contract, and Kidney Exchange,
62 DUKE L.J. 645, 650 (2012) ("Although NEAD-chain professionals leverage the available social
imaginaries of gift exchange and contract at different points of the transplant process, neither perfectly meets the practical demands of the NEAD system.").
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for "valuable consideration."93 Yet federal law also treats "human organ paired donation" as an exception to the prohibition on "valuable
consideration."94 From this exception, kidney exchanges and longer
"non-simultaneous, extended, altruistic-donor (NEAD) chains" have
emerged. 95 A paired kidney exchange "involves two patient-donor
couples, for each of whom a transplant from donor to intended recipient is infeasible, but such that the patient in each couple could feasibly
receive a transplant from the donor in the other couple. This pair of
couples can then exchange donated kidneys. "96 A NEAD chain is a
more elaborate form of paired exchange, in which a single altruistic
donor initiates "a chain of transplants among a series of donor-patient
pairs. Each donor has a kidney that is incompatible with 'her' patient, so instead each donates her kidney to the compatible patient of
another donor-patient pair, forming the next link in the chain."97 Like
replacement donors, kidney donors in such exchanges reap individualized but in-kind compensation - kidneys for their previously unmatched relatives or friends. This is remuneration, though it is treated
as altruistic under current American law.
Building on the experience with kidney exchanges, scholars have
also discussed benefit-sharing and directed-donation schemes. Professors Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner have proposed "altruism exchanges" as a solution to the persistent shortage of available
kidneys for transplantation. 98 Such exchanges would function as an
intermediary enabling "people to donate kidneys (and other things) in
return for a commitment by others to make charitable donations or
engage in charitable acts."99 Such exchanges would rely on the same
principle that animates the exception in federal law permitting kidney
exchanges. 100 Choi and colleagues argue that permitting kidney donors to extract monetary or other donations to causes of their choice,
rather than either cash for themselves or reciprocal kidney donations,
would be consistent with the focus on altruistic, non-self-directed donation currently prized (and permitted) under U.S. law.101
93

42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (20l2).
Id.
95 Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 20l4, at 289, 296.
96 Alvin E. Roth et aI., Kidney Exchange, II9 Q.J. ECON. 457, 459 (2004).
97 Healy & Krawiec, supra note 92, at 647; see also Kevin Sack, 60 Lives, 30 Kidneys, All
Linked, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. I8, 20I2), http://www.nytimes.com/20I2/02/I9/health/lives-forever
-linked-through-kidney-transplant-chain-I24.html (discussing "the longest chain of kidney transplants ever constructed," involving sixty people: thirty donors and thirty recipients).
98 Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 95, at 292.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 295 (explaining Congress's intent behind the exception to the "valuable consideration"
prohibition).
101 I d. at 300.
94
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The benefit-sharing principle articulated by HUGO and pursued
by PXE International in the context of the research body bank suggests that remuneration may be an appropriate part of biobank governance. The history of the clinical body bank and growing number of
modern examples indicate that the same kind of principle may prove
successful in the clinical context. Together, these examples offer an array of arrangements, neither purely gift nor market based, for recognizing that the body products currently housed and used in body
banking are property not merely for those who operate the body bank,
but also for those who supply it.
On the flipside of benefit sharing, practices in research biobanking
also suggest an approach to body banking that exacerbates the depersonalization of body products already embedded in some forms of
body-product regulation. Today, hundreds of millions of specimens of
human biological material are stored in hundreds of biobanks
throughout the United States, and the number of specimens continues
to grow by the tens of millions each year. 102 In many instances, research specimens have been collected for "one purpose [like medical
treatment] and subsequently used for another."103 According to one
recent study, more than half of American research biobanks reported
that they included in their collections "[r]esidual specimens acquired
from clinical care in hospitals, clinical laboratories, or pathology departments."104 Such secondary use of tissue often occurs without consent from the tissue source, "either because the [Institutional Review
Board] waives that requirement or because identifiers are removed so
that the samples are no longer deemed to involve' human subjects. "'105
Current American standards for legal and ethical research require informed consent only from persons whose "[i]dentifiable private infor-

102 Mark A. Rothstein, Protecting Privacy in Genetic Research on Alcohol Dependence and
Other Addictions, in GENETIC RESEARCH ON ADDICTION 84, 84 (Audrey R. Chapman ed.,
2012); see also I NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999) ("[A]s of 1998,
[it is estimated that] more than 282 million specimens of human biological materials were stored
in the United States, accumulating at a rate of more than 20 million cases per year .... ").
103 Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetics Research Using Archived DNA, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286,287 (2008); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,
480-82 (Cal. 1990) (discussing the removal of patient's spleen to combat hairy-cell leukemia and
the subsequent use of spleen cells for commercial production of a cell line to produce
lymphokines); Amy L. McGuire, Timothy Caulfield & Mildred K. Cho, Research Ethics and the
Challenge of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 9 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 152, ISS (2008) (discussing ethical difficulties and recommendations regarding secondary use of human tissue in the
context of whole-genome research).
104 Henderson et aI., supra note I, at 7.
105 Clayton, supra note I03, at 287 (quoting OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS (2004)).
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mation" is at issue. 106 Researchers routinely avoid these stringent requirements by de-identifying or anonymizing the human biological
samples with which they work. 107
The use of human tissue for research without consent is not idle
speculation. The case of John Moore, whom Swanson names in her
book to briefly link clinical and research body banking, involved the
unconsented-to use of Moore's spleen cells in research after Moore's

106 45 C.F.R. § 46.I02(f) (20I4) (defining "human subject" for purposes of the Common Rule,
which governs research involving human subjects conducted using federal monies, to include "a
living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains ... [i]dentifiable private information"). The Common Rule requires federally
funded researchers to provide human subjects with extensive information in the course of obtaining informed consent, including information about the expected risks and benefits of the research
and confidentiality procedures to be followed. I d. § 46.I I6(a)(2)-{3), (5). The regulations also
specify that protected "private information" is information that is "individually identifiable (i.e.,
the identity of the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with
the information)." Id. § 46.I02(f). The FDA imposes similar requirements on all studies submitted for its review. See 2 I C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 8I2 (20I5).
The agencies adhering to the Common Rule, including the Department of Health and Human Services, have recently proposed amending the definition of "human subject" to include "a
living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research ... [o]btains, uses, studies, or analyzes biospecimens." Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 54,047 (proposed Sept. 8, 20I5) (to be codified in scattered
sections of the Code of Federal Regulations) (setting out proposed section _.I02(e)). This definition would bring biospecimens under the scope of the Rule, regardless of whether those specimens
have been anonymized or de-identified. Id. at 53,936 ("[I]nformed consent would generally be
required for secondary research with a biospecimen (for example, part of a blood sample that is
left over after being drawn for clinical purposes), even if the investigator is not being given information that would enable him or her to identify whose biospecimen it is."). However, this
amendment would be prospective only. Researchers would still be permitted to use alreadyexisting tissue samples without obtaining additional consent, so long as the researchers followed
previously acceptable de-identification or anonymization procedures. I d. at 53,944 ("[T]he
[profferred rule] proposes to have the new definition of human subject apply prospectively, that is,
it will only apply to research involving biospecimens that will be collected in the future.").
107 See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,943 (conceding
that, under the existing regulations, "provided the biospecimens and data were collected for purposes other than the currently proposed research, it is permissible for investigators to conduct research on biospecimens and data that have been stripped of all identifiers without obtaining consent because the non-identified biospecimens and data do not meet the regulatory definition of
human subject"); id. (observing that many commenters to the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking opposed expanding the informed consent requirement to de-identifiable biospecimens
due to the added time it would take to obtain consent). Currently, both the Common Rule and
HIPAA provide straightforward routes for avoiding the need for informed consent through deidentification. See 45 C.F.R. § I64.5 I4(b)(2)(i) (enumerating eighteen identifiers, removal of which
renders what would otherwise be protected health information "de-identifi[edl" and outside the
scope of the HIPAA Privacy Rule); OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PRaTS., supra note I7
(reaffirming that the review and consent obligations ordinarily applicable to federally funded research do not apply to research using biological specimens that are not "individually identifiable").
As set forth above, the proposed revisions to the Common Rule would eliminate this loophole to
informed consent for federally funded human subjects research - at least with respect to subsequently generated research samples. See supra notes I7, I06. These revisions would not alter the
scope of HIPAA's Privacy Rule.
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spleen was removed as part of his medical treatment. 108 Henrietta
Lacks, whose cells gave rise to the first immortal cell line, similarly became a source for research materials without her knowledge or consent. 109 As an indigent African American woman in Baltimore, Lacks
was a patient in the public wards, where physicians "often used patients ... for research, usually without their knowledge. Many scientists believed that since patients were treated for free in the public wards,
it was fair to use them as research subjects as a form of payment. "110
N or is the use of human tissue for research without consent a thing
of the past or an indignity visited only on the poor. Recent lawsuits
have exposed researchers making use of thousands of stored human
tissue samples without asking any permission from the sources of those
samples. For instance, parents in Minnesota and Texas sued state officials for unlawfully retaining newborn blood cards indefinitely and
sharing those tissue samples with outside research institutions and
hospitals without parental knowledge or consent. 111 Consistent with
the experiences of John Moore and Henrietta Lacks, these parents
found themselves facing the uncontrolled use of private information
about themselves and their children. State officials thought asking
permission was simply unnecessary.
The use of these body products without consent may be troubling
for dignitary, privacy, familial, and other reasons. ll2 It may also raise
more directly utilitarian harms. Patients may forego physician or other medical interactions out of fear that their cells will become fodder
for researchY3 Moreover, while research unquestionably leads to significant societal advances, it may also inure to the detriment of the individuals from whom research specimens come. Research use of human cells without consent is often premised on their de-identification
or anonymization. But such processes, and the status of tissue as

108
109

Moore, 793 P.2d at 480-83.
See SKLOOT, supra note 53, at 29-33 (describing Lacks's admission to the public ward at

Johns Hopkins hospital for surgery, the limited consent form she signed, and the biopsy and delivery of her cervical cancer cells to a research lab).
110 I d. at 29-30.
111 See Complaint, Beleno v. Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs., No. 5:09-cv-OI88 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 12, 2009); Complaint, Bearder v. State, No. 27-CV-09-5615 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. II, 2009).
Under new federal law, parental consent must be obtained for the use of newborn blood cards for
federally funded research. See Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, Pub.
L. No. 1I3-240, § 12, I28 Stat. 285I, 2857 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 289 note (2012)).
112 See, e.g., Ram, supra note 20, at 125-37 (identifying four types of concerns that tissue providers may hold: control, confidentiality, commercialization, and cure).
113 Id. at 128-29 (collecting examples of individuals or communities who have avoided medical
interactions and interventions due to fear of subsequent use of their cells for research without
their consent).
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anonymous, are far from certain. 114 At a minimum, where effective
de-identification or anonymization cannot be accomplished, reliance on
such tools to circumvent otherwise-applicable consent requirements exacerbates, rather than alleviates, the burdens of research participation.
To date, clinical conscription of human body products from living
persons is rare, but the experience of the research biobank suggests
further depths to which a refusal to acknowledge property rights in the
progenitors of human tissue may descend. Troublingly, hints of commodification of body products without consent may already be apparent across the research-treatment divide. As set forth at the outset of
this Review, medical schools in possession of cadavers may, and sometimes do, sell off bodies and body parts to other institutions.ll5 In this
way, modern medical practice parrots the consent-free approach of the
research body bank. Medical schools or hospitals securing permission
for one purpose may nonetheless use a body (or its parts) for another
(revenue-generating) purpose. 116
CONCLUSION

Kara Swanson's Banking on the Body gives a rich history of how
the United States ended up with blood and milk banks that could, but
generally do not, pay the individuals who provide their wares. Her
careful work tracing the origin and development of the body "bank"
provides a useful lens for examining concepts of property in the body
and who may assert such claims. And Swanson identifies historical
evidence that contradicts the traditional narrative set forth for the
114 A number of recent studies have demonstrated that anonymization may not be achievable.
In one demonstration, researchers showed that "an individual can be uniquely identified with access to just 75 single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) from that person," while "[gJenomewide
association studies routinely use more than IOO,OOO SNPs to genotype individuals." McGuire &
Gibbs, supra note I8, at 370; see also Melissa Gymrek et aI., Identifying Personal Genomes by
Surname Inference, 339 SCIENCE 32 I, 32 I (20I3) ("[WJe report that surnames can be recovered
from personal genomes by profiling short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome (Y-STRs) and
querying recreational genetic genealogy databases."). See generally Angela L. Morrison, Note, A
Research Revolution: Genetic Testing Consumers Become Research (and Privacy) Guinea Pigs, 9
J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 573, 590-9I (20rr) (describing multiple studies demonstrating that it is possible to identify individuals from anonymized DNA samples). Reidentification is possible even from pooled or aggregated DNA data. See Nils Homer et aI., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using
High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, PLoS GENETICS, Aug. 2008, art.I, 2-6.
115 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
116 Presumed consent for cadaveric organ donation may raise issues distinct from the reallocation and sale of donated cadavers (or their parts) identified here. Under a presumed consent
framework, the law "presumes that one is willing to be a donor unless a prior refusal has been
recorded, or relatives have objected." Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law:
Organ Taking, Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. art. 2, ~ 4 (200I).
Where presumed consent is at issue, at a minimum, there is no substitution of a secondary use in
place of a use for which affirmative consent was given.
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downsides of paying people for their body products. Through her
work, readers can check the factual accuracy of claims about the
harms of providing payment for the raw materials for body-product
exchange. Swanson's work should inspire other scholars to question
whether the current body-banking system accurately reflects society's
values, rather than just the circumstances of history. It is a volume
well worth reading and learning from.
Yet Swanson's book takes up only pieces of the extensive scope of
body banking, leaving largely unexplored the complementary experiences of biobanking human tissue or genetic information for research
use. Given the sweep of Swanson's book, this omission is understandable, though unfortunate. Together with an analysis of research
biobanking, Swanson's book makes plain that permitting every entity
that interacts with body products to make money from doing so except the sources of those products - disserves research and medical
practices alike. Providing payment to the progenitors of body products, whether directly or through benefit sharing, need not result in
denigration of the human body (or spirit) or in exploitation. Indeed,
history indicates that providing remuneration may yield better access
to better resources - and with better outcomes for all - whether for
clinical or research use.
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